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SENTIMENTS, 




£11112^ P^Lcauon of the papers relating to the late negotiation, hi 
m T m br ° Ug ^ 5° hgh l a tfanfa *°" which I cannot help confiderin* a 
Mffi fe one of the moft amazing that hiftory can produce. A trlni 

5Sfff2 H I " '^ I . rema J kable ' ™d of fuch infinite importance 
nWnwlf A f CV 7- true A Bnton Z ^W fuppofe would confider it as a, 
objed : high y deferv.ng his moft attentive confutation. It will not only inforn 
him of the ftate of this negotiation, and the reafons why it was broke off but f 
will alfo clearly explain the real merits of a late Minifter who enjoyed thei 
moft unbounded good opinion. In my remarks on thefe original papers I fiia! 
proceed in the moft unprejudiced and difpaffionate manner; I Ihall attemn 
to lay before the reader the real tendency of the defigns of both ccurts, or I 
other words, of their Minifies, and the necefiary confequences which mu" 
have inevitably ^attended the peace, had it been concluded on the foundation 
which we now fee was fketched out for it. 

For many months paft, the people of England have amufed themfelves withl 
arguments concerning the comparative value of North-America and Guarda-* 
lupe ; how will they be furprized on reading thefe papers to find, that the lat- 
ter was defigned to be given up, and in fad the former alfo ! How will the 
thinking part of this nation wonder to find a lhare in the Newfoundland-fiiherv 
granted to the French, for the trifling confideration of the demolition of Dun- 
kirk How an fliort , will they be aftonifhed, at the whole of this ftrange ne- 
gotiation ! the moft abfurd, the moft contradidory, and the moft unpolitical 
negotiation on the part of England that could have been profecuted ' W 



, " - - r •& "■"«■ v.wu« u imvc ocen prolecuted ! W . 

have earned on^i moft expenfive war in every part of the world , and our arrffe 

^ : — J ^ 



[ ? ] 

•y advantageous acquifitions, which, if we keep them, will repay our 

lormous expences, by encreafing our commerce, and ruining the trade of our 

lemies. The moft (hallow politician furely would pronounce at once, that 
je very firft object of a peace with France, ought to be a prefervation of our 
[refent extenfive commerce •, I fhall endeavour to explain whether this impor- 

tnt point met wiih that attention from the late minifter, which it fo evidently 
[eferved. But as it is my defign to convince the reader by found arguments 

traded on facts, rather than by any declamatory exclamations, I fhall at onec 
•oceed.and criticife on the moft important articles of this famous negotiation. 

1'he French miniftry by way of introduction to their hiftorical memorial, 
ive prefixed a recapitulation of the chief events of the war, thrown into fuch 
[light as belt ferved their turn ; after which follow fome letters that paffed 
?tween the duke de Choifeul and Mr. Pitt, concerning the bafts of the enfuing 
?gotiation, and epochas to be referred to ; as there was no fettled agreement 
(etween the two courts on thefe points, I fhall not detain the reader with any 
:marks on them, but pafs to a memorial of the French miniftry of much 

eater confequence, dated jhe 15th of July, 1761. 

ARTICLE £ 

The king cedes and guaranties Canada to the King of England, fuch as it 
las bGen y and in right ought to be pofTeffed by France, without reftriction, and 
without the liberty of returning upon any pretence whatever againfl this ceflion 
nd guaranty, and without interrupting the crown of England in the entire pof- 
:flion of Canada. The king in making over his full right of fovereignty over 
Canada to the King of England, annexes four conditions to the ceftion. 1. That 
he free exercife of the Roman catholic religion fhall be maintained there. 2. 
That the French inhabitants and others, may fell their effects and retire. 3. 
That the limits of Canada with regard to Louifiana fhall be eftablifhed, as well 
ks thofe of Louifiana and Virginia. 4. That the liberty of fifhing and of dry- 
ing their cod-fifh on the banks of Newfoundland, may be confirmed to the 
French as heretofore : and as this confirmation would be illufory, if the French 
'veffels had not a fhelter in thofe parts appertaining to their nation, the King 
of Great-Britain in confideration of the guaranty of his new conquefts, fhall 
reftore Ifle Royale or Cape Breton, to be enjoyed by France in entire fove- 
reignty. It is agreed to fix a value on this reftitution, that France fhall not 
binder any denomination whatever, erect any fortifications on the ifland, and 
^^llconfine herfelf to maintain civil eftablifhments there, and the port for 



I 3 3 I 

In the memorial in anfwer to this, the entire pofifefiion of Canada with* I 
any limits or exceptions, is infifted on, and the demand of Cape Breton ab I 
lutely reje&ed •, but in confideration of Dunkirk being demolifhed, it is agnl 
that the fubjects of France ihall fifh and dry their fifh on part of the banks I 
Newfoundland under certain reftrictions. The French then delivered an u I 
matum in anfwer to this memorial, wherein they infifted on the Roman catll 
lie religion being tollerated in Canada; and inftead of Cape Breton, demarl 
ed the ifland of St. John, or fuch other port for the purpofes above-menticl 
ed •, and as Great-Britain in her memorial had objected to the adjacent coul 
tries between Canada, Louifiana, and the .Englifli colonies being confiderl 
as appertaining to Louifiana, the French now propofed that thefe countnB 
fhould be neuter, and ferve as a barrier between the two nations. On the M 
of September the anfwer of England to this ultimatum was delivered, ail 
infifted that, 

Canada fhould be ceded to Great-Britain, according to the limits traol 
Out by the marquis de Vaudreuil, when he furrendered the faid province I 
Sir J. Amherft-, that the Roman catholic religion fhould be tolerated, Thl 
in confideration of Dunkirk being demolifhed, the ifland of St. Pierre fhoul 
be ceded to France, on condition that no fortifications fhould be ereded, M 
troops maintained ; and that it fhould ferve as a fhelter for no other naticB 
befides France -, nor was it to give any right of fifhing in other places thai 
thofe exprefly mentioned ; and laftly, that an Englifh commifTary fhould hi 
allowed to refide there. 

That as to the limits of Louifiana, the French had comprehended fuel 

countries in their fketch as could not be agreed to -The French minift I 

delivered an anfwer to this, but it had no reply. — 

I have here, in as fhort a compafs as pofhble, given the . fubftance of thl 
whole negotiation on the article which related to North-America. And 
cannot but remark, that we did not enter into the prefent war with a defign tl 
conquer Canada, but only to fecure our colonies ; and I think it will not be verJ 
difficult to prove, that this end would not by any means have been anfweredl 
had the French court agreed to the above terms, which would inevitablj 
have produced another war. The very firft article in this negotiation oughl 
to have ceded all North- America to us, for Canada alone would have anfwereJ 
no fingle purpofe, but our pofleffing ourfelves of the fur trade, which is a verjl 
inconfiderable thing. By letting them remain in pofTeflion of Louifiana, wJ 
leave to them one of the fineft countries in the world, fituated along the back o\ 
cur colonies; which fituation would give them thofe very advantages wlyP I 



C 4 I 

aching on us whenever they pleafed. This extenfive country has been 

Jiverfally allowed to be of forty times the importance of Canada ; it produces 

JTJ thing which the latter does, and a vaft variety of other articles. But 

fuuation is what ought particularly to have made a Britifh Miniftry deter- 

I ne never to leave it in the poflTeffion of France. Let us cad our eyes 

I a map of thefe immenfe regions, and we (hall fee at once, that the French 

|SuId have even greater opportunities to encroach on us from Louifiana 

in from Canada, and for this plain reafon; the countries between it and our 

lonies, are of a much greater extent (more than double) than thofe which 

j ,rt our pofleffions from Canada. The French very artfully propofe, that 

j efe mould be neutral, but the Britifh Memorial rejects that propofal, be- 

R ; ufe they contain nations under the proteclion of Great-Britain. Now it is very 

l ain from hence, that thefe intermediate nations would in fact be under neither 

[ ance nor England, and confequently either would be able to encroach on 

"e other : this was the cafe with Canada where the intermediate fpace was 

[St half fo extenfive. A little reflection will make this affertion appear to be well 

oundcd. 

Between the two Carolinas and Louifiana are many nations of Indians under 
variety of names, which are faid, in the Britifh memorial, to be under our 
otection, yet fome of thefe Indians are at this prefent time actually at war 
»ith us-, witnefs the expedition of Colonel Grant, and the many advices we 
ive had from the back fettlements of Carolina, of their invafions. As a proof 
To how little thefe Indians are under our protection, or rather dominion, we 
^ed but obferve in the map the feveral French forts in the heart of their coun- 
fy, particularly fort Condi ; and I cannot but obferve that it is a flagrant in- 
We of ignorance in the Britifh Minifter not to mention thefe French forts 
his Memorial which afferts, that the countries here fituated are under Britifh 
protection. Can it be fuppofed he would not have taken notice of this 
Lad he known it r Not mentioning it on fuch an opportunity, is almoft a contra- 
diction to his other affertion. Does it not from hence appear that thefe coun- 
ties which were to have formed. a barrier, would at any time be open to the 
'ncroachments of the French P The Indians of the Five Nations formed the 
harrier between our colonies and Canada, and were under the protection of the 
King of Great-Britain, but we found, by dear bought experience, that the 
[French were neverthelefs able to command their country by means of the forts 
[which we have fince happily conquered. 

If that perfidious nation was able to ufurp fuch very confiderable tracts of 
juntry on the borders of Virginia, and our more northern colonies, how much 



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•s of the Creek and Chicafaw Indians ? On the Ohio they could not build 
warehoufe but it was prefently known to our back fettlers, but in Louifiana. 
•y may ered another Lille without our knowing any thing of the matter* 
dmay foon win over to their interefts all the intermediate Indians: a taflc 
3 have no reafon to think will prove difficult, fince they have already brought 
em to make war upon us, and have built forts in their countries. Yet thefe 
,dians are fuppofed, by the Britifli miniftry, to be under our protedion, 
,d are to form this famous barrier *. Had we infilled on the M.ffiffipp. be- 
,a regarded as the bounds of Louifiana, the above objedions would in a 
reat meafure have been rejeded, but our amazing ignorance in demanding the 
Son of thefe countries without fpecifying the exad limits of the French 
olonv muft neceffarily lead us into many miftakes greatly to our prejudice, 
fhe Britifh Memorial afferts, that fuch and fuch Indian nations are under our 
.rotedion- why not fay, that all the Indian nations of whatever name, whofe coun- 
ts are filled on theeaft fide of the river MiJiffiPP m fought to be regarded 
is under the protection of Great-Britain, and any fort, or lands m pofeffion of. the 
French in the faid countries fhall be direStly demolifhed and regarded as ufurpattons, 
particularly fort Conde and fort touloufe. Now let me afk any unprejudiced man 
whether fuch expreffions would not have conveyed a much clearer idea of the 
countries than the vague ones ufed by the Britifh Minitter ? The nations which 
He aS are under our protedion all extend to the Miffiffippi, and yet he 
omitted that demand which could not be mifconftrued. 

. It is fo far from my intention to interpret any thing contrary to its real meaning ffiat I mail 
g Wethe words o^^^^^t^^^^ ■■ <* ■* fitted 
b. ViSfySSS tdT-^ 2SE his I** >s W- to re je a fo unexpeaed 
a propofition as by no means ^^f^J^^ of Louifia „a, annexes vaft countriea 

the moftfolemn capitulation mconteftably yielded ^ nl ° " £ contentions the pretentions of the 

Vl r Mrtries on that tart of the Ohio which have been heretofore contefted. 
° f l h Th lin propof d J Sxthe bounds of Louiftana cannot be admitted becaufe ,t would com- 
T Z^ZrilTont^Ue of the Carolina*, very extenfive countries and numerous nauons 
ttraveiys'been reputed to be under the protedion of the King, a right winch his Majefty 
LsnoTntentn of renouncing ; and then the King, for the advantage of peace, rmght confenc 
ha, no intention o 6 > ^ ^ Grea t , Britai and particularly the Cherokees, 

nannnnnd 



C 6 j 

Perhaps it may be faid in anfwer to this, that the Jketch here prefented to \ 
pubhck by the French court is only a rough draught of the peace that cannot be c 
Jidered as pofttive in any particular. Agreed: but does not this rough drat, 
give us the fentiments of our Minifter on every point ? The Britifh Men 
rial takes notice particularly of other limits more northerly, and of the lib 
(in fome degree) of the French cod filhery, but only prefents us with this i 
gue account of thofe of Louifiana ; the fame Memorial is alfo particular 
many other refpecls, but this care happens to be where it is of leaft imp ( 
tance. I (hall here give the fifteenth article of the peace of Utrecht, whi 
relates to the limits of the French and Englifh colonies, as it will throw fort" 
light on the prefent argument. « The fubjefts of France inhabiting Canadf 
' and others, (hall hereafter give no hindrance or moleftation to the Five Ni" 
" tions or cantons of Indians, fubjeft to the dominion of Great-Britain, n<^ 
to the other natives of America, who are friends to the fame. In lik? 
' manner the fubjeds of Great-Britain (hall behave themfelves peaceably tc 
wards the Americans, who are fubjefts or friends to France; and on hot , 
fides they (hall enjoy full liberty of going and coming on account of trade 1 
As alfo the natives of thofe countries (hall with the fame liberty refort a 
they pleafe to the Britilh and French colonies, for promoting trade on one fide 
and the other, without any moleftation or hindrance, either on the part of the 
BntXh fubjecls or of the French. But it is to be exadly and diftindly 
lettled by commifianes, who are, and who ought to be accounted the fubrds 
" and friends of Britain or of France." 

This article abfolutely gives up the dominion of the Five Nations to Great- 
Britain the treaty of Aix le Chappelle confirmed the fame, and alfo left the de- 
cifionof the hmiis to commiffaries ; therefore does more than the Britilh Memo- 
rial requires in the late negotiation, with refpeft to the fouthern Indians who are 
crty under our proteclion : and yet the French no fooner figned thefe treaties than 
they immediately began to encroach. Can we expeft that they lhould be more 
complaint for the future ? And efpecially when we give them a greater oppor- 
tunity ol doing it with .mpunity ? If the treaties above-mentioned had defined 
the bounds o the two colonies to be the river St. Lawrence, no difficulties 

M tir k" 6n I ""r Had ^ Bm,(h Mem ° rial in the like manner infixed on the 
Miffifiipp, being tne limit of Louifiana, it would have added very much to the 
fecunty of our plantations. This Memorial only mentions the King of Great- • 
Britain s claim to the protection of the Indians in queftion, and confequently 
gives up any claim we may have to the dominion over their country, a ftroke 



[ 7 J 

fine exactly to which nation fuch or fuch a tract of country really originally be- 

ged, whether by purchafe or grant from the natives % the above article of the 

" aty'of Utrecht yielded and allowed the dominion of the Five Nations to belong 

us, although the limits of their country were not fettled. If we enquire j 
ff :o the real ftate of the cafe, we (hall find we have full as clear a right to the 
minion over the fouthern Indians as over the Iroquois, or Five Nations ; but let 
is be as it may, we ought undoubtedly to have infilled on it in a treaty with a 
jropean power \ inftead of which we gave up (in the Britifli Memorial) trie 
,rht to a dominion over them for a right which in the very nature of things 
H nnot poffibly exift ; that of protection. How can we pretend to be the pro- 
\ flors of a people, who are fo far from being protected by us, that they are 
|)w at war with us and in league with our enemies ? Was there ever fuch a 
*ht heard of, as that of one nation protesting another againft its confent, and 
>folutely contrary to its defire ? Such is the right which is fo ftrenuouQy in- 
led on in this Memorial ! 

This notion of protection is abfurd in another refpect. If we only rail our- 
Ives the protectors of thefe nations of Indians, I have already fhown we can 
ive no right to a fovereignty over their country, and confequently cannot pre- 
nd to prevent th-ir doing what they pleafe in, and with it. The nations men- 
oned in the Britilh Memorial, are the Cherokees, Creeks, Chikafaws, Chactaws, 
nd another nation-, which other nation I take to be the Alibamous, or elfe the 
'lat Heads. Now the country which thofe Indians inhabit is upwards of four 
undred miles broad and above fix hundred long, each as the crow flies. The 
readth is from the Miffiffippi to the planted parts of Carolina^ and the length 
rom the Gulph of Mexico to countries lbuth of the Ohio. This im- 
nenfe tract of the country is wider than any part of our colonies that are fituated 
k gainft it •, and would have been only under ourprotettion by this Memorial. The 
ndians might certainly fell half of it to the French for gunpowder and brandy, 
ind yet be protected by us, and this would have juft the confequences that the 
indetermined limits of Canada were attended with. The French are already in 
Dotfefuon of great part of thefe countries by means of Forts Conde and Touloufe, 
the latter of which is three hundred miles from the Miffiffippi j and without 
doubt they would encompafs our colonies with a chain of forts from the Gulph 
of Mexico to the Ohio ♦, what terrible confequences this would have I need not 
point out to the reader; and what makes this pafc a doubt is, they would have 
a right to do this if they got the Indians confent. 

There cannot be a more falfe notion than to imagine the countries in North 
America can be confidered in the fame manner as thofe in Europe : when we 

mtm 



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tion.% it h the very reverfe of what it is in America. Flanders has always beet 
confidered as the barrier between France and the Dutch -, the King of Sardinia 1 ! 
dominions, may be called the barrier between France and Italy -, but thefe coun- 
tries are really barriers •, the French can poflfefs themfelves of none of the barria 
towns in Dutch Flanders without making war; many are garrifoned with Dut 
foldiers, and no part of the country can be bought by the French for brandy 
gunpowder ; add to this the whole country is known. In America the countri 
which would have feparated the pofTefllons of the two nations, muft naturally 
attended with the very contrary circumftances in every refpedt. 

In order to fhew that the Britilh Minifter himfelf regarded thefe Indian natio 
as a barrier between the Englifh colonies and Louifiana, we need only turn to t 
Memorial of the 29th of July, in which are thefe words— the nations and couth I 
tries which lie intermediate, and which form the true barrier between the aforefaii 
■provinces, not being proper on any account, to be direclly or by necejfary confequenm 
ceded to France, &c. The meaning of thefe words cannot be difputed, and thefl 
fhew in the cleared manner that Great-Britain's only fecurity for her colonies do 
pended on the good faith of France. One remarkable inflance of the very fam< 
jiature, will tell us what certainty there is in that. By the extract I have alreadj 
given from the treaty of Utrecht it appears that France acknowledged the fovejj 
reignty of England over the Iroquois or Five Nations, but yet fhe built hejj 
chain of forts on the Ohio, almoft as foon as the treaty of Aix le Chappellt 
(which confirmed it) was figned ; now it is very well known that fort du Quefnejh 
{lands in the very center of the Iroquois country. Let us fee the foundation on! 
which fhe pretended a right to this tract. In a memorial delivered by the Duke; 
de Mirepoix to the Britilh Miniflry May 14, 1755, is the following article, 
" It is inconteflible from the principles which agree with the titles, with juftice, 
" with the law of convenience and the mutual fecurity, that the Ohio ought ta 
" make part of the poilerTions of France. The Englifh have no fettlements on 
.** this river, and when the Br itifh Minifters maintained this propofition ; that the 
* c fources of this river are full of antient fettlements of their nation ; it was plain 
cc they had trufled too much to falfe relations. The French have always looked 
<c on this river as dependent upon Canada, and it is effential to her, in order to 
" the communication of Canada with Louifiana -, they have frequented it at all 
" times, and in numbers. It was even by this river that they fent the detachment 
W of troops which were fent to Louifiana about the year 1739, on occafion of 
?« the war of the Chikafaws*." Such are the rights which France pretended to 

contrary 



t 9 1 

contrary to the moft folemn treaties! Had peace been concluded on the tern 
offered by the Britifh Miniftry, we fhould in a few years have had her aiTertin 
the law of convenience, and grafping at all that immenfe tracl of country v/hic 
fhe juft before acknowledged to be under our protection. When we have been : 
recently ufed in the mod perfidious manner by that nation, can any reafons upc 
earth be fufficient to make us give them an opportunity to do the very fan 
again ! No two cafes can pofTibly be more parallel than the treaties of Utrecl 
and Aix, and the late negotiation, in refpecl to intermediate countries. By tl 
former the country of the Iroquois was acknowledged to be under our dominioi 
and was to be the boundary between Canada and the Englifh colonies ; by the latt< 
the countries inhabited by the fouthern Indians were to be under the protectio 
of Great-Britain, and to ferve as a barrier between the two nations. Nothin 
can be more alike than thefe cafes, and we may depend upon it that the conf< 
quences will alfo be juft alike if ever we are fo mad as to conclude fuch 
peace. 

If the Miffiflippi is not made the limit, of Louifiana (and we fee clearly n 
fuch thing was thought of in the late negotiation) and all the countries eait < 
that river ceded in full fovereignty to Great-Britain, we mall give up the ver 
end for which we went to war, the fecurity of our colonies y for the French b 
means of a few forts more added in a chain to thofe of TouloulTe and Conde, wi 
be able to confine us into a narrow flip againft the fea of not a greater breadt 
than three hundred miles, whilft their colony of Louifiana will be above a thou 



courfe ; or would not the court of London have at leaft made complaints of it ? But at that tim< 
there was no queftion nor the leaft mention made, of the pretenfion which has been raifed up fmce 
without proof, without title, and without any fort of foundation. It is true that in latter year 
fome Englifh traders have patted the mountains of Virginfa, and have ventured to carry on a fu 
trade towards the Ohio with the favages. The French governors of Canada contented themfelve 
at firft, with fending them word that they were on the territory of France, and forbidding them t 
return on pain of having their goods feized, and themfelves made prifoners : they returned not 
withftanding, and their goods have been confifcated and fold, and their perfons feized and con- 
dueled to Quebec, from thence to France, where they have been detained in the prifons oi 
Rochelle : no claim, no complaint was made on this occafion by the court of London j they have 
been confidered only as fmugglers, vvhofe defire of gain had expofed them to the rifque attending 
an illicit trade. Having thus afcertained nvithfo much folidity the right and poflefiion of the French 
on the Ohio and its tenitory, their being fatisfied to ftipulate, that all the territory between the 
Ohio and the mountains which border Virginia, mall remain neutral, and that all trade and 
paflage through it fhall be interdicted as well to the French as to the Englilh, ought to be confider- 
ed as a very fenfible proof of their love of peace. " 

C fan< 



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id miles wide*. We cannot reafonably fuppofe that the French would neglect 
lilding fuch forts as foon as fuch a peace was concluded ; their former conduct 
i the Ohio tells us very plainly that they know their own intereft perfectly well, 
id if we may judge by our conduct, much better than we did ours. If a peace 
ad been concluded on the terms offered in the late negotiation they would have 
id a right to erect thefe forts, with only getting the confent of the Indians, 
"owit cannot be aflerted that we mould not have fuffered them, and mould have 
.■(trained them by a claufe in the treaty, becaufe we in the very fame article give 
p our right to do that by faying that thefe Indians are under our protection, 
;id they are fuppofed throughout the negotiation to be independent nations, 
ut every quibble, every difpute would have been rectified, had our Minifter 
lifted on the Miffifilppi being the boundary of the pojfejjions of the two crowns 
1 thofe parts •, that river is two or three miles wide in its whole courfe through 
lefe countries : fuch a boundary could not have been miltook, and by our 
lanting the bank on our fide directly, we mould foon obtain a thorough know- 
dge of the whole country, and put it out of the power of the French to en- 
roach without openly invading* 

I have hitherto endeavoured to convince the reader that the peace, had it been 

oncluded on the plan propofed by the Britifh Minifter, muft neceffarily have 

tft our American colonies infecure, although their fecurity was the original end 

f our entring into the prefent war. I think I have proved, and from facts, 

ather than empty reafoning, that this infecurity would have been owing to our 

•.ot infifting on the Miffiffippi being made the limit of Louifiana, and our colo- 

ues} and I conceive that it will take very little ingenuity to convince the unpre- 

udiced, that the Britifh Minifter ought by all means to have infifted on France 

:eding all North America to Great-Britain •, and that fuch a conduct would have 

3een much more wife and more for the intereft of his country than keeping a 

ihare of the neutral iftands, or Senegal and Goree, or even than the Eaft Indies. 

. Canada is of little or no importance to us -, and of none to the French 

wnkfs connected with Louifianaf -, we might have learned this truth long ago, 

had 

* I cannot avoid once for all afluring the reader, that I do not hazard thefe afiertions relating to 
ihe extent of the countries in queftion, without having frrft examined them in the beft maps, with 
fhe moft Scrupulous attention. Without having confulted good maps, no perfon can fpeak on the 
point without making many miflakes. 

t " The truth of the matter is, they were tired of Canada. The inclemency of the climate, 
the difficult accefs to it ; and a trade fcarcely defraying the expence of the colony, would long ago 
^have induced them to abandon it, if the plan of extending its boundaries, at the expence ot the 
lf .tirii(h. and of orcnine its communication with Louifiana and with the ocean, had not made them 



[ " 3 

had we attended more to their fchemes of uniting them by their chain of fort 
When once they had rendered this chain ftrong enough, they would hay 
given their greater! attention to the fouthcrn parts as colonies. Canada produa 
nothing that can ever poffibly make a colony flourifhing ; and our being po 
feffcd of it, will be of no further confequence to us, than adding to the fecurit 
of our northern colonies, and gaining about one hundred and forty thoufan 
pounds worth of furs, annually. The uncultivated lands of our own planta 
tions, are far more fertile than the barren waftes of Canada. But how differen 
a country is Louifiana ! capable of bearing almoft any thing from the tempe 
of the fky, the goodnefs of the foil, and from the multitude of long, deep 
and beautiful rivers, with which it is every where enriched and adorned ; thei. 
are moil of them navigable for hundreds of miles into the country. They an 
principally the Mimflippi, whofe head is unknown, but it almoft goes quiet 
through North America, and at certain feafons overflows its banks for a vaO. 
way on both fides the Ouabache, almoft equal to the Danube j the great rivers 
Alibama, Mobile, and feveral others. The face of the country is almoft 
wholly plain covered with (lately woods, or fpread into very fine meadows. 
In mort Louifiana, particularly the northern part, (for the mouth of the Miffif- 
fippi is barren) without a.n- of thofe heightemngs which it received, when it 
was made the inftrument to captivate fo many to their ruin, is in all refpecls a 
moftdefirable place*. The French fettled here raife fome indigo, a good deal 
of cotton, fome corn and rice, with lumber for their iQands •, but the colony is 
not very vigorous on account of the fhoals and fands, with which the mouth of 
the Miffiffippi is in a manner choaked up, and which denies accefs to any very 
laro-e fhips ; the French have according to their ufual cautions and wife cuftom, 
melted feveral forts in the moft material places, and fortified New Orleans their 
capital, and indeed the only city in Louifiana, in a regular manner. This city 
is not remarkably fair, large, or rich : but it is laid out regularly in a fine fixa- 
tion, on the banks of the Mifiiffippi, in profpeft of an higher fortune. The 
whole colony isfaid not to contain above ten thoufand fouls whites and negroes f, 
yet with all its difadvantages this colony is not declining, and if ever they mould 
make the mouth of the Miffiffippi more tradable (and what is impoffible to 
ambition and induftry ?) Louifiana will in a few years wear quite another face, 
t will fupply their Weft-Indies with boards, ftaves, horles, mules, and provi- 

fevere : Canada itfelf is not worth their afking, and if they do defire to have it reftored to them, 
m only be with a view to repeat the fame injuries and infidelities, to punifh which, we engaged 
;he prefent war." Earl of Bath's Letter to two Great Men, p. 30. 
* See the account of the European fettlements in America. 



C «* ] 

Hons. It will fend tobacco into France-, and increafing the conveniences of its 
mother country and filler colonies, it will increafe its own traffic, its inhabitants, 
and its power." 

• This defcription of Louifiana, which is extremely juft, I have extracted from 

; more authors than one, and it fhows very clearly the immenfe importance of 

that vaft country. But how will it flourifh when it becomes the only object of 

the regard of the French in North America ? When the expence which attended 

.Canada is laid out on this promifing fettlement, where every thing confpires to 

.render it a mod formidable rival to our American power. How eafy will it be for 

; the French, in cafe of a new war to invade our colonies from hence ? And when 

, once they have cultivated, and experienced the great advantages refulting from 

, the poiTelTion of it, we may be very certain that they will fpare no cofts in 

j ftrengthening it, and by keeping up a ftrong body of troops here, (which they 

}may do for much lefs expence than in Old France) they will put our plantations 

]to the immenfe expence of erecting barrier forts for the extent of upwards of a 

( thoufand miles, and when a war breaks out, they can at any time invade our 

r fouthern, and weakeft provinces *. Here it may be faid, that we /hall at any time 

he able to repel force by force, and to conquer Louijiana as we have done Canada - 9 

c a poor and inefficient anfwer ! The conqueft of G^ada has actually coft us 

a eighty millions ! and fo we are to leave Louifiana in the hands of the French, 

j becaufe, in cafe they encroach, as they always have done, we mail at any time 

t be able to repel them at the fmall expence of eighty millions ! But can we 

anfwer, that the French will be as eafily drove out of the latter, as they have 
been out of the former : the conqueft we have already made, baffled all our 
efforts for years, and at lafl was won but by a miracle •, for all parties now agree 
that Wolfe's fuccefs can be confidered in no other light. Will not the French 
rather take the greateft care to fecure themfelves with every poffible precaution ? 
Can a fleet of Britifh firft rate fhips of war, fail up to New Orleans, as they did 
to Quebec ; and altho' we might have, eafily taken it by General Amherft's army 
being navigated down the Ohio and Miffiffippi, yet it will not be, ten years hence, 
fo weak as it is now. Quebec was not half fo ftrong as New Orleans might be 
made at a fmall expence, for it ftands on a dead flat 3 and furrounded with 
marines and lakes. 

* " For if we can have no fecurity whilft the French have any place from whence they may in- 
* vade our colonies, you ought to have carried your demands Hill further ; you ought to have de- 
manded the whole country of Louifiana ; becaufe from thence France undoubtedly may invade our 
colonies, and what is of more confideration, the weakeft of our colonies, thofe to the fouthwaraV* 
hlr. Town/kind's Remarks on a letter to two Great Men, p. 5 1 . 



[ M I 

If the French thought it fo well worth their while to fortify and cultivate, 

le barren colony of Canada, how much more pains will they take with Louifi- : 

na, where all their expence will be amply repaid by its vaft fertility •, and where j 

little induftry will have fuch great effects, as to render it one of the mod im- 
ortant colonies in the world, The river St. Lawrence is froze up for near 
.iree quarters of the year-, but Louifiana has many bays and mouths of rivers 
»n the Gulph of Mexico, which are always open, and where capacious harbours 
nay be made. In fhort, we cannot pofiibly form too high an idea of the vaft impor- 
ance of this country •, and we (hall undoubtedly in a few years (if we leave it in the 
lands of the French) repent our not infilling, that the firft article of the peace 
hould cede all North- America to Great-Britain. An attentive confideration of 
.he late negotiation, will plainly tell us, that, had the French thought of mak- 
ng peace at all, we might have got fuch a ceflion made, inftead of others lefs 
important to us. But even if their miniftry had refufed to agree to fuch an ar- 
ticle at firft, we mould never have thought of making peace without it *. 

And 

This was one of their great reafons for being fo intent upon fecuring the Miffiflippi, and 
Iriving the Spaniards from about it at Penfacola in 1719, becaufe they fay, " This navigation to 
Lcuifiana, will further procure us a free (or forced) refort to the two famous ports of the Gulph 
of Mexico. Viz. the Havana and Vera Cruz." {Second voyage' of La Salle, p. 188.) And we 
may fee by the quantities of gold and other Spanifh commodities, taken in their mips from the 
Miffiflippi in the laft war, that they have not only found a way to the Spaniih ports from thence 
already, but likewife to the mines of Mexico ; to which they have an open road, and a fecure trade 
commonly followed by them from the Miffiffippi. The French no fooner went to this river after 
! the peace of Utrecht, than the firft thing they attempted was this trade to the Spanifh mines. For 
this purpofe, they immediately fent a (hip to Vera Cruz, and a convoy over land to the mines of St. 

.Barbe. It is but two hundred and eighty leagues from New Orleans to thofe mines; which is 

but a fmall way for the French to go for gold and filver, when they go fo conftantly all over North- 
America upwards of one thoufand leagues for a few beaver fkins This is a grand objeft which 

the French have in view, which makes them fo intent upon fecuring all thofe vaft countries they 

call Louifiana ; which not enly leads to, but muft command the adjacent mines of Mexico . 

It plainly appears from hence, as well as from all other accounts, that their views are not only the 
fecurity of Canada, but of Louifiana, which muft give them the command of the Spanifh mines, 
whenever they End it proper and convenient ; befides the whole trade and commerce of that conti- 
nent in time.— —This their fettlement on the Miffiflippi, if not taken notice of, is likely to 
turn to as great an account to them in time, as they conceived it might in 1 7 1 9. They are not only 
convenient here to go to the mines of Mexico to which they have a good road already opened by 
land, and begin to carry on a confiderable trade there ; but if they encreafe and ftrengthen here, 
as they muft foon do in fo fine and extenfive a country, while they have fuch a fuperior force adjoin, 
ino- to this in their iflands, they muft by means of thefe two fo eafily joined together, and conftant- 
ly^fupporting one another, foon be able to reap all the profits of the Spaniih treafures in America, 

if not to feize them ; a thing that all Europe is concerned in furely, as well as Britain ! All 

thofe things have been meditated for many years, but they are now come to a crifis, and we muft 



1 14] 

And here T cannot help reflecting on the amazing conduct of our miniftry, ir 
not attacking this colony, which at prefent is fo far from being formidable. I 
ought certainly to have been the very firft object of our attempts after Canad; 
was in our poflefiion. A great force at an immenfe expence, (much fuperior tc 
what would have been required for the conqueft of Louifiana) is gone againf 
Martinico, which is not of fuch confequence to us. General Amherft migh 
have conveyed his whole army down the Ohio and MifTifTippi, with as much 
I eafeas he proceeded through a much worfe and more impenetrable country, by x\\t¥ 
way of Crown Point by water to Montreal. It would have been a mod remark-^ 
J able advantage, to have been able to proceed by water for upwards of three Tl 
thoufand miles on fuch an expedition ; and the country is fo very fruitful, and ie 
abou ds fo with deer and tame cattle, that an army might be maintained in it 
perhaps eafier than in any other country in the world. But there are many otherjic 
realbns which mud be evident to the reader without reciting, that prove very 
clearly how ill our miniftry judged in preferring an expedition againft Martinico, |^ 
to one againft New Orleans. 

The firft article of the feveral memorials between the courts of Great-Britain 
and France, which I inferted above, alfo ceded to France a mare of the New- 
foundland fifhery, in confideration of Dunkirk's being demolilhed, according to 
the treaty of Utrecht. 

If the fame miniftry who made that peace and alfo that of Aix, had again pro- 
pofed fuch an article as this, I fhould not have been furprized ; but that a man 
of our Patriot Minifter's abilities, mould give up the intereft of the nation in a 
point of fuch immenfe importance, I own is fomething odd, or at leaft it appears 
fo at firft fight, though this paradox as well as many others, might perhaps be 
eafily reconciled with common fenfe. The vaft confequence of this fifhery mould 
undoubtedly have prevented our miniftry, from ceding any port to France in j 
thefe parts. We offered them the ifland of St. Peter -, this fpot which has 
z convenient port, is very finely fituated for the cod fifhery, as well as any point 
of Newfoundland, and they might undoubtedly make it of as much confequence 1 
to them for fiihing as ever Cape Breton was, but this ifland is not the only cef- j 

matters of them already, only with a handful of men, how will they ever be rooted out of them, 
when they come to be well fecured and fortified in them, the firft thing they will do without doubt ; 
and to encreafe and multiply as they mull do in fuch fruitful countries ? It will then be in vain to 
fay, that Britain ought to 'vindicate its rights to thofe countries ; or that Spain is endangered by them. 
They mull both fubmit to the fate they have brought upon themfelves, if they fuffer the French thus 
to over-run North-America, and to fecure and fortify themfelves in it. We never fee them part 
with a place they once get fure footing in ; nor give up or neglect fuch advantages as thofe here re- 
prefentcd, the Spanifh treafures in America." See The Conte.fi in America, written by Dr. Mitchell; 



I *5] 

on made by us, for the right which the French had by the peace of Utrecht, 

confirmed of fiming and drying their fifh on the coafts of Newfoundland * f 
fow it is very plain from the fituation of this iGand, and the part of the coaft 
: Newfoundland which is for their ufe, that they might, and mull necefTarily 
ive railed as great a fifhery as ever the polTeflion of Louinburg gave them ; for 
e reader is greatly mrftaken, if he imagines that that town affifted their riming 

any other reipecl, than as a pore for their fhips to rendezvous at. St. Peters 
and is as well fituated as Cape Breton, and they doubtlefs, if ever they come 

be polTerled of it, will make it as great a nurfery as the other. 

The value of their cod fifhery before we drove them quite out of it was im> 
enfe. It was unbounded, and ineftimable, annually employing at lean: a 
oufand fail, from two hundred to four hundred tons and twenty thoufand 
en. In the year 1730, there was a computation made of two hundred and 
renty thoufand quintils of fifh at Merfeiiles only, for a market, and commu- 
7us annis they cured above five millions of quintals. How dangerous a nur- 
ry of feamen has been and ever will be while in their poffefilon is very obvious, 
d yet this was only x\\t\v ffoare •, much greater indeed than ours. If we were to 
ep the whole of this fifhery in our own hands at a peace we fhould gain annu- 
y two millions of pounds fterling, by the lowefl computations ; for it ccca- 
ms a confumption of manufactures greater than what can at firft be conceived* 
would not only be depriving our enemies of fo important a branch of their 
tde, but would abridge the revenue of France by leffening the confumption of 
ench fait, the profit of which is folely in the crown, and more than half of 

The thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht : " The ifland called Newfoundland with 

adjacent iilands (hall from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain ; and to that end 

town and fortrefs of Placentia, and whatever other places in the faid ifland in pofleffion of the 

nch, (hall be yielded and given up, within feven months from the exchange of the ratification of 

treaty, or fooner if poffible by the moil Chriftian King, to thofe who have a commiffion from 

1 Queen of Great- Britain, for that purpofe. Nor (hall the mcflChrifiian King, his heirs and fuc- 
brs, or any of their fubjects at any time hereafter lay claim to any right to the faid ifland and 
ids, or to any part of it or them. Moreover it (hall not be lawful for the fubjects of France, to 

1 ify any place in the faid ifland of Newfoundland, or to ereel any buildings there befides ftages 

r le of boards, and huts neceffary and ufual for drying of fifh, or to refort to the faid ifland beyond 
time neceffary for fiihing and drying of fifh. But it fhall be allowed to the fubjects of France, 

( :atch fifh and to dry them on land in that part only, and in no other befides that, of the faid 
;,d of Newfoundland, which flretches from the place called Cape Bonavifla to the northern 
at of the faid ifland, and from thence running down by the weftern fide, reaches as far as the 

:e called point Riche."' The clauie in the Britifh Memorial is, " Saving always the privilege- 

nted by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht to the fubjecls of France, to fifh and dry 

\ r codfifh on a part fpecified of the banks of Newfoundland, which privilege is prcoofed to be 



[ i6] 

vvhicli that was made in the kingdom was employed in this fifhery. At the fame 
time the revenue from our own fait trade, which (lands engaged for a confider 
able part of the national debt, may be made to encreafe in proportion as that oi 
France is lefTened. Were we pofieffed of this fifhery alone, it might be an eter- 
nal nurfery of thirty, forty, or perhaps fifty thoufand feamen, fince nobody 
can tell the improvements which would refult from the fole pofTeffton. 

Such is the invaluable confideration which we offered in the late negotiation 
for the demolition of Dunkirk ! If the Minifter who offered to make fuch a fa 
crifice had not been the favourite of the people, he would have been regarded 
from this alone, as the enemy of this country. It may perhaps be faid, that 
Dunkirk is an object of real fear in the Englifh, but I can allow no fuch thing; 
formerly it was feared much but never with any grounds, and a demand origl 
naily to demolilh it was unjuft and abfurd ; we have juft as much right to make 
the demolition of Breft an article in a peace, as we had to expect that of Dunkirl 
at firft. But if this place was of fuch great confequence as fome very obftinatehj 
infift it is, fure it can never be allowed of fo much importance, as even the tenth 
part of the Newfoundland fifhery •, France contains many Dunkirks, but fhc 
potteries only one fifhery. If we examine any lift of the prizes made during the 
courfe of the prefent war by the French, we fhall not find that a large propor- 
tion of them was carried into Dunkirk •, many other ports of France have beei 
more fatal to our trade, and particularly Bayone : why don't we demand that the 
harbour of this neft of privateers be demolifhed ? This abfurd conduct is founded 
merely on the French principle the law of convenience. As to invafions, we havi 
little or no reafon to fear Dunkirk, (nor indeed all the ports of France) on that acj 
count, for all the expence that ever was, or ever can be laid out on it, will never 
make it capable of being a firft rate harbour •, and if it could admit very large 
fhips of war its fituation renders it very improper for an invafion, for no port cat 
be fit for that, unlefs it is very near the part of the enemies coaft they would in- 
vade. Now from Dunkirk a fleet muft fail a confiderable way before it can lanl 
troops with fafety : all our Kentifh and fouthern coafts quite to Portfmouth are ft 
excefhvely ftrong, and the country fo deep and impenetrable, that an enemy could 
not even land ; or if they were landed, make any progrefs. For thefe reafons 
the French will never fit out an expedition fleet from this port, but only make 
a great parade of naval preparations at it to frighten the Englifh : if it was really 
formidable to the greatefl degree, if its harbour was as extenfive and deep as 
thofe of Breft or Toulon, yet we fhould have no more reafon to be afraid of - it 
than of thofe towns •, much lefs to give fuch an immenfe confideration for its de- 
molition, I have endeavoured to prove that the French by means of the pofTef 



of the treaty of Utrecht, would foon have revived their fifhery, and railed \ { 
as great a height as ever : fuch an acceflion of wealth would foon have enal, 
them to render many of their ports more truly formidable to us than Dank- 
Sure we ought more to fear a nurfery of twenty or thirty thonfand French feam<j 
than a paltry French port! By the cod-fifhery they will be enabled, more p I 
haps than by any other branch of trade, to revive their navy ♦, and I beli a 
every unprejudiced perfon will agree with me, that we have far greater reafoa! 
fear an acceflion of naval power to France, than any fingle port in that kingdo-. | 
All the fortifications in Europe cannot make a French port formidable -, tra* 
alone can raife a navy -, and if we had taken care to prevent them from railing 
trade, we mould never have had the leafl occafion to fear French ports. 

The ignorant may fancy tfiat as long as Louifburg is demolifhed, and Caf 
Breton is ours, we have no reafon to fear the power of France in thofe feas. B* 
nothing can be more abfurd • it was not Louifburg that was of fuch bad confv 
quence to us, but the fiourifhing ftate of the French fifhery, which depende 
merely on places to dry their fi(h on, and erect warehoufes. The fortificatior 
had nothing to do with the fifhery, and the want of them could never have pre 
vented its enereafe; we offered them an ifland for their neceffary purpofes as we 
fituated as Cape Breton, and much nearer the great fifhing bank. Here the 
would foon have carried on as fiourifhing a fifhery as ever they did from Louii 
burg, and eonfequently would have raifed by natural means a vaft number o i 
failors, who would always find conftant employment. Can Dunkirk be reckonec 
an equivalent for a fhare of this trade ? And a fhare unlimited, for the Frencl 
by our propofals might have employed ten thoufand fail in it, if they pleafed. Ir 
ftiort, no arguments in the world, can poffibly convince the knowing reader, thai 
Dunkirk can be confidered as a proper equivalent for a fhare of the cod-fifhery. 
This is one of thofe articles which ought to have been entirely in our favour* 
But when the Britifh Miniftry were fo impolitic, as at once to offer an equivalent 
for demolifhing that port, we could not but expect, that forpething of forty times 
its value would be given for it. No peace mould have been thought of that left 
the French at liberty to employ a fingle fhip in this trade, for a treaty could not 
contain an article of greater importance : Inftead of feeing the great confequence 
of it, our Miniftry in their very firft Memorial^ offered to yield a fhare to France 

in confideration of this trifling equivalent.- The next ceffion to France, is the 

iflands of Guardaloupe and Marigalante : In the firft memorial of France it is 
propofed in 

The 3d, 4th, and 5th ARTICLES. 

* c That France fhall reftore to England the ifland of Minorca In confide 



,-ral iflands to remain fo." In the Britifh Memorial it was anfwered that, 

rhe inand of Minorca fhouid be immediately reftored France mail imme- 

ely reftore and evacuate the conquefts fine has made over his Majefties allies 
bermany, that is to fay, of all the eftates and countries apperta.n.ng to the 
hdarave of Hcffe, to the Duke of Brunfwick, and to the Eledorate 01 Han- 
•rfand of all the places and territories belonging to the King of Pruffia, in 
ileffion of the arms of France. In a word, France mail make a general eva- 
sion of all her conquefts on the fide of Heffc, Weftphalia, and its countries 
—The King of Great-Britain on his part agrees to furrender to his Moft Lhnt- 
n Maiefty, D i. Bdlehle, 2. Guardaloupe and Marigalante. 
I have thrown thefe feveral articles together, as they plainly have aconneftion 
lih each other. It is evident that the point of importance here is the reftitution 
Guardaloupe. The three principal points that were to be difcuffed in this 
•aty were, North- America, the cod-filhery, and the fugar trade -, thefc are all 
•' far greater importance, I apprehend than any thing die. In refpedt to 
orth-America, our Miniftry neglected to fecure our coloniei: they gave up a 
are of the filhery ; and we mall now find, they would have reftored Guarda- 
upe It has often been faid, that the ends which a nation ought to have an- 
gered in making a peace are, 1 . the thing for which the war was properly and 
Iftly 'begun ; 2. An indemnification for the expences of carrying it on. We 
itMtolvior fecurity for cur colonies; and none of our conquefts would by 
nv means be a tolerable indemnification, except, the cod-fifhery, and theTugar 
fade Canada upon the plan of the late negotiation, would have been of little 
onfequence befides that of adding to the fecurity of our northern colonies ; but 
f Louifiana had been ceded to us, the whole would have paid «ff the expences of 
he war The cod-fiftiery we fhouid foon have loft, and we mould have re- 

lored Guardaloupe. . ' 't 

'■ Every undemanding reader muft confefs, that the grand point which we mould 
have had in view in a peace with France, muft be, to ruin their trade by cutting 
off its fources It will not be difficult to fiiow that the fugar trade is one of the 
"principal 'of thefc ; that nation had carried this branch of. their commerce to 
fcch an amazing and formidable height, that they had before we took Guarda- 
loupe beat us out of all the markets of Europe , this increafe of their trade 
was owing chiefly to the poffcffion of Guardaloupe About the time of the 
treaty of Utrecht, we fupplied the greateft part.pf the fugar confumpt.on 
throughout Europe. France, far from contending with us in the foreign market,, 
took from us great part of what fhe ufcd at home. From the year ,5,15 jo 
i j7 ,q, we exported one year with another eighteen thoufand, five hundred and 
L79 " ~ P - - ^ ..,. f . llf . l^rhan half; for we 



tm 3 

"tent abroad but nine thoufand and fixty four communibm annis. We continm 

regularly on the decreafe to 1739, m which year our fugar export had fallen 1 

four thoufand and feventy eight hogftieadsr Since that time it has fallen almc 

to nothing. Now let us turn the other fide, and view the fugar trade of Franc 

fince the lame period, the treaty of Utrecht. At that time the French exporte 

no fugars. But mark the revolution. In 1740, when the Britifh trade in tha 

article was in a manner annihilated ♦, France after ferving her home confumptioi 

at a very eafy rate, exported no lefs than eighty thoufand hogfheads of fugar. I 

which, with the gains of the commiflion, &c. was reputed to be worth to France 

more than a million fterling *, to employ forty thoufand ton of {hipping and foui 

thoufand feamen, folely in bringing it from the Well-Indies to Europe*. Surely 

thefe facts tell us in the cleared manner the neceflity of keeping pofTefTion of 

Guardaloupe ; but I have not infilled on a multitude of other articles, which 

this ifland produces in great quantities, befides fugar, and which are of im- 

menfe value, and add a vail increafe to its' trade : there is no neceflity of beings 

exact in fuch reprefentations as thefe \ the outlines of the picture are too flriking 

to need the aflidance of colouring •, it mud be allowed by every body that this 

ifland is of prodigious importance ♦, that its trade is one of the principle branches of 

the French commerce •, and that it, confequently,, is one of the fources of their 

naval power. 

If thefe facts are allowed, as fure they muft be, I think it mud appear evident 
to every Briton, that we ought to have infilled on the pofleflion of Guardaloupe, 
as the cod-fifhery was to have been reflored, and Frenchmen left in North -America. 
By giving up this ifland we fhould give with it a vail accefllon of naval power to 
our dangerous rivals, and without keeping any thing ourfelves that will form a 
ballance to what we give up. Let us but reflect on the flourishing date of the 
French commerce at the breaking out of the prefent war, and we fhall be convin- 
ced of the neceflity there is for us to curtail it. This war fuoceeded only a five 
years peace, a very fliort time to revive a trade, and raife a powerful navy. Yet 
we found their commerce rofe to a prodigious height, and a navy that rendered 
France formidable even to the firfl maritime power in the univerfe. At the con- 
clufion of the peace of Utrecht, the trade of France was in a deplorable condi- 
tion •, fhe had not then five hundred veflels of all forts in the world. At the be- 
ginning of the lad war, but thirty years after, they had eighteen hundred. Their 
lofles in that war were very great, and yet their loffes in this (hew,, tha; in a very 
little time they have more than repaired them. Wherever the vital principal 



For more of this argument fee, " Remarks on a Letter to two .-Great, Met 



n 



[ 20 ] 

bfifts in fall vigor, wounds are foon healed *. Such quick renovations plainly 
*11 us the importance of their colonies, and among the reft their fugar ones : if 
ftefe are the fonrces of that power which enables them to kindle up fuch violent 
"ames in every part of the world, fure we ought to be particularly careful at a 
a eace to deprive them of as many of their colonies as we poflibly can -, and tho* 
'rp attempt to keep every thing we have conquer'd perhaps would be unfuccefsful, 
a et we certainly ought never to make one, that did not leave us in pofle(Tion of 
confiderable indemnification for our enormous expences. Nothing that we 
r hould have kept, (by this negotiation) could be regarded even as a reafbnable 
pne, except thofe articles which I have fhown would have been given up to the 
^French. This conduct in our Miniftry was. certainly againft the interefl of their 
ountry -, but what fhall we fay to thofe infatuated men who had rather have any 
.peace than none at this time, and who think our great Commoner did not make 
•concefTions enough ! f J 

t I have here endeavoured to (how the importance of Guardaloupe, and confe- 

? quently, of the neutral iflands, confidered merely with relpect to their own 

{ value, to either nation : but fure the reader muft perceive that Guardaloupe and 

/Belleifle in the Britilh Memorial, are fuppofed to be equivalent confiderations for the 

{ |French evacuating Germany ; for after the article which refpects that evacuation, 

the next begins, " The King of Great-Britain on his fart agrees" to the reftoririg 

thofe two iflands. Surely any Briton zealous for the interefl of his country, muft 

[ feel an honeft indignation at thus feeing the honor, as well as moft important 

I concerns of this kingdom, offered to be facrificed for the fake of a parcel of 

h petty princes in Germany ! We are neither bound by gratitude nor honor, to 

j. infift on the French evacuating the countries of thefe people, we are pleafed to 

i call our allies. The reader fhould remember that they are no further our 

allies than by letting troops to us, and in the treaties for thofe troops we are 

bound to pay them very fufficient.fubfidies, but no mention is made that we, 

= at a peace, are to infift on the French quitting their country. For the fake of 

. "fubiidies they run all the hazard of ruining their dominions, and by their perfift- 

ing ftill to let out their troops, it is very plain they are well paid for them, notwith- 

* Account of the European Settlements in America. Vol. II. p. 22. 

f The D — e of B has fpoke in p 1 warmly for a peace, any, rather than 

none. 

% Extrafl from a memorial of the deputies of the French commerce, to their royal council 1701. " 
— «» The navigation of France owes all its increafe and {plendor to the commerce of its fugar 
iflands, and that it cannot be kept up and enlarged otherwife than by this commerce. 'Tis beyond i 
ail doubt that this commerce is m ore beneficial to the Hate than all others, (of long voyages) that are j 



[ *i ] 

imdino- their country is ruined by the French. Of what confequence is it to 
lireat-Britain, whether the Landgraviate of HefTe be porTeffed by French troops 
d not 5 or whether Wefel and Guelders, and other countries belonging to the 
ng of Pruffia, are left in their hands -, for by the feveral memorials and letters, 
is plain that the French offered to withdraw all affiftance of any kind from the 
nprefs Queen, provided we did the fame by the King of Pruffia ; and this 
ainly (hows, that we might have left that monarch's territories in Weftphalia 
their hands, under the name of the Emprefs Queen, without the leaft endan- 
;ring him. But what can we fay to this article, when we fee the ifland of Guar- 
iloupe ceded to France on account of her evacuating them ? Would not the 
tereft of this nation have been fold, and facrificed, without the leaft {hadow of 
ght or reafon ? In fhort, Guardaloupe is of fuch immenfe importance to us, 
id the German territories of fo little confequence, that I cannot help being 
nazed at the infatuation of giving the one for the other. What may we not ex- 
;ft in a future negotiation, in cafe bad fortune attends the King of Pruffia I 
sfe have juft as much reafon to give back every conqueft we have made to pro- 
jre him good terms of peace, as we have to reftore any one, on account of his 
ominions in Weftphalia. The whole value of thofe territories for which we 
'ere to cede Guardaloupe to France, would not amount to the fortieth part of 
le value of that ifland. Such are the politics of our Patriot Minifter ! As to 
he value of Minorca and Belleifle, I (hall not enquire into them, but believe 
hey may be to France on a par ; they are not fo important as the other articles ot 
his negotiation. 

The ninth ARTICLE of the Britifh anfwer to the ultimatum of France. 

« With regard to the fuccour to be afforded to the King of Pruffia on the part 
3 f ■the'Bri!ifh°crown as an auxiliary, after the conclufion of the feperate peace 
Detween Great-Britain and France, his Majefty remains in the fame inflexible re- 
solution, which he declared at the firft overture of the prefent negotiation, that 
he will never defift from giving conftant fuccour to the King of Pruffia as an 
auxiliary with efficacy and good faith, in order to attain the falutary end of a ge- 
neral pacification in Germany. With this view, his Majefty, far from propof- 
ing to leave France at liberty to fend armies into Silefia, without being limited to 
the number ftipulated in her aclual engagements with the court of Vienna, (a circum- 
'fiance not to be found in any part of the ultimatum of England) has uniformly 
declared, as the thirteenth article of the faid ultimatum profeffes, that Great- 
Britain and France, mall be at liberty to fupport their refpeftive allies as auxilia- 
ries in their particular conteft for the recovery of Silefia, according to the en- 



I 22 J 

gage merits entered into by each crown. The King declares at the fame time 

that his Majefty has neither the intention, nor the authority, to take upon him t. 

inhibit and forbid any foreign troops from entering into thefervice and pay of th.1 

King of Pruflia ; however his majefty might be inclined to confent not to furnifiV 

but by means of fubfldy, thofe fupplies which Great-Britain mail judge conveni ; 

ent to grant his Pruflian Majefty, purfuant to her engagements." 

, I have given this article at full length, as it mows clearly that the Britifh Mini 

ftry were determined not to renounce the Pruflian caufe on any account whatever 

I mail not enter into the old enquiry concerning the expediency of a German 

war as I think it a difpute which common fenfe muft have determined in the 

minds of the unprejudiced long ago; there is noneceflity to revive this, but we 

had no occafion to proceed in any unfair way with Pruflia, for if France would 

renounce her engagements with the Emprefs Queen, we might with honor do the 

fame by the King of Pruflia ; that the French court would have done this, is 

w plain from the following . . 

« Since the Memorial of the propofuions from France was formed, and at the 
( inftant that the courier was ready to fet out for London, the King received the con- , 
i fent of the Emprefs Queen to a feparate peace with England, but upon two con 

ciitions : * 



i. To keep pofieflion of the countries belonging to the king of Pruflia 
, 2 ' Th " 1 , t . fllal1 be , % ula «d that the king of Great-Britain, neither*in his 
capacity of king or eleftor, fhall afford any fuccour, either in troops, or of any 
kind whatever to the king of Pruflia ; and that his Britannic majefty will under- 
( take that the Hanoverian, Hefllan, Brunfwickian, and the other auxiliaries in 
aihance with Hanover, fhall not join the forces of the kino- of Pruflia, in like 
manner as France fhall engage on her part, not to yield fuccour of auy'kind to 
the Emprefs Queen nor her allies. 

Both thefe conditions appear fo natural and equitable in themfelves, that his 
majefty could not do otherwife than acquiefce in them, and he hopes that the 
king of Great-Britain will be ready to adopt them." 

It appears very plainly from hence, that the peace between Great-Britain and 
France ,s never likely to be concluded to the advantage of either nation, ifwe 
do not make the fame conceflion with regard to our German allies as the French 
It may feem ftrange that our Patriot Minifter, who makes fuch prodigious offers' 
where they tend to the deflation and ruin of this kingdom, fhould be fo very 
.unreaionable in refpeft to the affairs of Germany. I fty unreafonable ; for we " 
are never likely to have a peace, if the refpeftive German interefts are not fepa! 
;iated from thofe of Great-Britain and France in a negotiation. This condudt 
Certainly appears very odd, but our furprize furely will ceafe^ whcnwereme 



>r that the fame man who would have facrificed the i'ntereft of this nation for 
e fake of foreign ones, is he, who once railed mod violently at continental 
mnections under whatever circumftances, and afterwards adopted them with 
ore zeal than any minifler that ever preceded him. 

The Tenth AR T I C L E of the laft Britifh Memorial. 



£C 



With regard to the captures made after the commencement of hoftilities. 

id before the declaration of war, the king continues of opinion, that fuch a 

;mand on the part of France, is neither juft nor maintainable according to the 

oft inconteftible principles of the right of war and nations." 

This article was certainly maintained with commendable refolution- by the 

ritiih Miniftry, and the unreafonablenefs of the French in demanding the re- 

tution, was founded in nothing but injuftice and contempt of the law of na- 

>ns. They were the aggreflbrs in the prefent war, and alfo began hoftilities, by 

vading countries which either belonged to us or ought to have been regarded as 

:utral, in America. Now if our enemy attacks us in one country, are we not 

liberty by the law of nations to refent fuch conduct by attacking them in an- 

:her : the forms of declarations of war, can with reafon be regarded as nothing; 

at forms ; eiTences are much fuperior ; In fact the French declared war by at- 

cking us in America. It is very plain from Rouille's letter to Mr. Fox in j 75 6 y 

iat the French themfelves thought war might be declared without regarding the 

•rms of it ; he concludes his letter with thefe words, " But if contrary to all 

Dpes, the king of England refufes what the king demands, his majefty will re- 

ird this denial of juftiee as the mofi authentic declaration of war, and as a formed 

sfign in the court of London, to difturb the peace of Europe." Might 

ot we with the fame juftiee regard the denials of France to reftore their encroach- 
lents in America, as an authentic declaration of war ? Certainly: and they, by 
lofe encroachments did in reality declare war againft us. It is no wonder that 
le French miniftry in the memorial which they delivered expreisly on this fub- 
•c"t, fhould llur over the imaginary difference between commencing hoftilities 
nd declaring war ; they fay, ? It is not neceflary to conteft the principle, that 
he right of exercifing hoftilities does not always refult from the formality of a 
eclaration of war." — —What tottering foundations muft an argument have 
tt$e begins with fuch a falftiood •, it was very neceflary to begin the negotiation, 
»n this point, with fuch an enquiry, becaufe the determination muft necefiarily 
onclude the debate for one party or the other. If war is declared, not by 
yords but by actions prior to words, the anfwer is evidently for us -, but if the 
1 : ■ ; '■'•■ 



t H ] 

then 'tis as evidently for the French. The principal argument which the Fr 
give us in defence of their demand of reftitution is founded on the ninete 
article of the treaty of Utrecht, by which it is agreed that in cafe a new 
breaks out, the mips, &c. on both fides in the dominions of either party 
not be confifcated till fix months from the date of the rupture * but in an 
to this we may reafonably alledge that the French had broke 'the treaty ( 
that of A.x la Chapelle) and rendered them no longer binding, by their 
croachments in America. According to the principle advanced by Fra 
one nation is obliged by the letter of a treaty to remain peaceable, w 
the adverfe nation has broke and infringed it in more particulars than one. 
this day no treaties are binding between France and England, becaufe the t 
nations are at war ; and treaties, by the law of nations, are rendered of no efi 
when broke in any material particular. Nothing is clearer than that the Fra < 
began the war by commencing hoftilities on countries which, as I fakkbefl 
either belonged to us, or were neutral ; fuch a conduct was declaring v 
againft us as effectually as if the forms were obferved, and confequently 
former treaties ceafed to be binding. . - , 

The eleventh article of the anfwer of the Britifh Court to the memorial 
French propofitions. 

» As the indifpenfable care which is due from his Majefty to his peop] 
and the juft and mvincible motives which concern the prefervation and fecuri 
of his kingdoms, authorized by the moft formal ftipulations of folemn treat! 
{viz. thofe of Radftadt and the barrier) and even by the exprefs and irrevocab 
conditions of the ceffion of the Low-Countries, will not allow France to n 
tain pofleffion of Oftend and Newport, the two places aforefaid fhall be eva 
cuated without delay by the French garrifons ; it is for this reafon declared tha 
the reft.tunons fpoken of in the preceding articles of this memorial, and parti 
cularly the convention which is to be framed and regulated with refpeft to tk 
Indies cannot take place till the aforefaid evacuation of Oftend and Newpor, 
Jhall be faithfully executed. 

Eleventh ARTICLE of the laft Britifh Memorial. 

Concerning the evacuations of Oftend and Newport the King cannot but J) 

, fer to the moft exprefs and irrevocable ftipulation of the moft folemn treaties, 

and exprefTed in the eleventh Article of the Ultimatum of Great-Britain, as 

alfo to his declaration relative to that fubjeel, and his Majefty relies on the ftn- 

xemy of the declarat.on on the pan: of France ; that is to fay, that the intention 



[ 2 5 ] 

of his mofl Chriftian Majejly never was to keep pojfeffwn of the aforefaid places after 
the return of peace" 

What a farce is exhibited in thefe two articles ! hidifpenfible care, and invinci- 
ble motives fhine forth in the firft, with fuch a blaze that one would think the 
very exiftence of England depended on thefe two towns ; in anfwer. to this 
prefTing demand, the French king allures us he never intended to keep poflerTion 
of them ; and our patriot Minifter gives up in the record, this point to the 
word of a French king. In reading the firft of thefe articles, I own, I was 
.greatly pleafed to find the honour and intereft of the nation fo well underftood, 
land fo refolutely arTerted, on a point of fuch great importance. But when I 
•found that fuch a pompous rout had been made merely as a puff to evaporate 
in fmoke, my indignation was moved; and it cannot but be fuppofed that every 
true Briton will regard fuch contradictory fentiments with the fcorn they deferve. 
Ought a Minifter to confide in the word of a French miniftry (a wordfeldom, if 
: cver t given but with defign to be broken) on a point which fo nearly concerned 
the indijpenfible care of a monarch for his people, and the invincible motives of 

their fecurity ; ought fuch a word, I fay, to be the dependence of that 

people on fo important a point ? If the evacuation of thefe towns is of real im- 
portance, as it certainly is, furely we fhould have had fomething to rely on be- 
fides this very doubtful word. In the firft Article which I have quoted it is declared 
contrary to treaties that the French ihould be in poffefilon of them. Was it 
not alfo contrary to thofe treaties that they fhould get polTeffion of them ? If it 
was contrary, did not the French break them when their troops marched in ? 
We fee therefore that the very caufe of fuch an article as this exifting, is a 
breach of faith in the French ; and yet we in the very fame breath take their 
word again in the very fame cafe ! 

But the evacuation of thefe towns is of real importance to Great-Britain, and 
of far too much confequence to be left to the word of the French king in a 
treaty of peace. One would think it ignorance, or wilful over-fight in our 
miniftry not to take any notice of the French troops being in poiTeftion of many 
other towns in the Auftrian Netherlands, alfo contrary to treaty ; they certainly 
have the fame right to garrifon every town in Flanders as well as Oftend and 
Newport. This country, which is in a manner in their poileftion, is that impor- 
tant fpot for which we, among fo many other nations, have expended fuch 
rivers cf blood and mines of gold. It has been one of the principal objects of 
Bfitifh politicks for above an hundred years paft •, our monarchs have taken 
the field themfelves in its defence, and to keep it out of the hands of France, 
Yet our fublime miniftry in the late negotiation had too exalted notion-- \ 



[a<5] 






ing out fome fmoke balls of pompous phrafes> and then taking the French king* 
word for our fecurity ! 

We cannot reafonably wonder at the unconcern of the Emprefs Queen abou 
thefe her territories, when we confider that they bring her in no revenue ; th 
produce of all the taxes being fpent upon the country and in keeping a cour 
at BrufTels. But to France this country is of immenfe importance, the fituatioi 
of it is the moil advantageous in Europe, and by ftretching along againfl on 
coaft, and bordering on the Dutch, would anfwer their defigns completely 
If they were in poiTeffion of it they might at any time over-run Holland 
which would transfer to them an immenfe trade at once, and endanger the li 
berties of all Europe. The real importance of this country was always un 
derftood by Britilh Minifters till now; and the French very well know fcj 
what confequence it is to them. In the laft war it was debated in the Frenc] | 
king's cabinet, whether they mould not abandon their navy and colonies to thei 1 
fate, and aim all their endeavours at the conqueft of Flanders and Holland \ 
by that means regaining their former naval power, and adding a vaft increaf if 
to it. We very well know that this project, had it not been over-ruled 
might have been executed with great eafe -, the Dutch now, are far from bein^ 
the people they were ; their trade, and confequently their riches, have bea 
above fifty years greatly on the decline, and at home they are fo weak that i 
French army might penetrate with little or no refiftance even to Amfterdam it 
felf. This event may one day or other happen, and what fatal confluences i 
would have, mud be evident at the firft thought. Nothing could prove a to 
lerable remedy for fuch a misfortune but Great-Britain's immediately attacking 
France, and never making peace till fhe had reduced the united French anc 
Dutch trade to a medium with her own ; if we confider the long train of bac 
confequences that muft inevitably attend fuch an affair furely we mud be fur 
prifed at the negligence of our miniftry, in looking fo tamely on the Frencl 
being pofiefted of Oftend and Newport, the keys of Flanders •, and on thei) 
aftonifhing credulity in taking the French king's word for their evacuation. If th< 
French were polTerTed of thefe important countries, befides the vail acceffior 
of trade, manufactures, and revenue, their fituation would abfolutely give then* 
the command of Germany and Denmark, and, in fome meafure, of the north, 
fuch a vaft conqueft, (and how eafy might it be made !) would well repay 
France for every conqueft it was poffible for our fleets to make from them, 
and they would foon poffefs a navy fuperior to ours. But is it plain that the 
Britifh miniftry feemed to know the importance of thefe two towns ? Is 
it not alfo evident that they gave up a point of fuch great confequence to 



The Thirteenth ARTICLE of the Britifh Memorial. 

««The treaty concluded between Meflrs Saunders and Godcheu cannot be 
l m Jed as the bafis of the re-eftablifhment of the peace m Ana, becaufe 

aTprovifional treaty has had no confequences, and becaufe thofe p royifions 
'e by nJ means applicable to the prefent ftate of affairs m the Indies, by the 
„a 1 redXn of the poffcffions and fettlements of the French company uithf 

diefbu as the perfe* and final fettlement with regard to that country t 

n only be made in conformity to certain rights abfolutely appertaining to ., 

e Englim company, and as the King cannot juftly difpofe of the, nghts . 
athout their confine, it muft neceffarily be left to the companies of the two , 

dons to adjuft the terms of accommodation and reconciliation, according to . 
1 ofe rules of reafon and juftice which the ftate and circumftances of their affairs s 

ay require, and mutually point out, provided neverthelefs that thofe cond:- , 
ions S not repugnant J the def.gns and equitable intentions of the, fove- f 
eigns for the peace and reconciliation of the two crowns. i 

The French miniftry immediately accepted this propofal, and no wonder ■ \ 
Bnce the fpirit of it is exadly adapted to the French max.m of negotiating and : 
oTcllg Ities, the leading as much as f^%^^^% 
and the decifions of companies and commiffanes. The leaft penetratum win 
nLm ufttt nothing wodd be eafier for the French than to leave affairs* : 
he Sft-Indie ^n fuch a doubtful manner, that they might occafion another 
war at a more ^omifing period for France. This was the ca e with North- 
Imeria aTthe^reaties Sf Utrecht and Aix. The limits were left -de-rmined 
to be fettled by commiffaries, and the confequence was, the prefent war. Thus 
5n the Eaft-lndies how eafy would it be for France by fome feeming advance 
for our company, to gain their point in letting fome article be left doubtful . 
afterwards, when they had a mind to renew the war there would be a data- 
ble point, negotiations would be begun, and the conclufion, a war : it Way 
be faid that the Eaft-India trade is of no advantage to us, and consequently 
that we fhould not engage in one for the fake of the company $ whether the 
rade is of fo much advantage as it would be if laid open, I mail not enquire, 
but that it is of very great advantage is certain, the contrary prejudiced opinion 
is now fully exploded, almoft all the nations of Europe are fo fully perfuaded 
of the importance of this trade, that they either have, or had compames ; but the 
force we have always kept in thefe parts, in time of war is an evident proof 
that our miniftry always thought this trade very well worth defending : Can it 



therefore be fuppofed that we mould ever fuffer the French to «.V i 

?zt •*«* we 8H < L * ~ *« y saws*? 

rvJi ■ , cnaraC ter of a Briton) or dec amat on, but bv fafl-s ml 

cool argument, that had a peace been concluded, on the terms offered Sou 

C oTltbad" " 1 ? haV£ P1 '° Ved " ™ C b3d ° ne » -d beentt ended 7 . 

Tont^ttrl 5 thatwe fhou,dnot have ke p ta "»/«*"' «£53 

cation for our immenfe expences, as we offered to reftore the French a mare 
m the Newfoundland filhery, and Guardaloupe, fifc. and that in confeou n e of 
thefe two points the peace muft have been very bad. I have furthl endea 
voured to prove, that fuch a peace muft have endangered Gtm^Sa^t 
fennments of our Minifter himfelf, by neglecting the evacuation of "hf Low- 
Countnes by the French troops. And, laftly, that the- affairs of the Faft IndL 
would neceffanly have been left in fuch a doubtflil manner, bat thFre h 
at any tune might make it the reafon of entering into a new, and perhap o 
appearance, juft war And I may add that the negotiation wa carried on upon 
. a principle which will at any time prevent our having a tolerable peace thTof 
conneAing German difputes with the immediate ones of France and^ngland - 
If thefe affert.ons are founded in faclj, as I flatter fclf the reader ^„ find 
they are furely we may reafonably conclude that all the conquefts which we 
made under the admimftration of the late Minifter, would not near balance tie 
miicmefs and fatal confluences that muft inevitably have attended fuch a dift 
advantageous peace. a ai1 ' 

* I have taken no notice of the Spanim Memorial, a., the affair was dropp-dbv' the F™,!, u . 
our Minifter, m reject to his anfwer, behaved with honour and refelution ? } ' Frenw < but 



[ 2 9 3 

And now who can reflect: on the popularity of a man that was ib near being- 
fatal to the interefts of his country, without amazement at the infatuation of a^ 
deluded people ? What opinion ought Britons to entertain of a minifter who in- 
volved his country in expences unknown before his adminiflration ; who run his 
country above iourfcore millions in debt, to dig a grave for Britifh foldiers in the 
deferts of Germany. What other end would have been anfwered by thofe immenfe ; 
expences, had a peace been concluded on thefe terms ? Surely this nation ought 
at leaft to connder the merits of a man who is a candidate for their favour before, 
they pronounce pofitively for him. We were blefTed, it is true, under our late Mi- 
nister's adminiflration, with many glorious conquefts ; and for the mare he had in 
thefe events we owe him great praife ; but is that faying that this Minifter can n< 
verdo any thing to forfeit our good opinion ? Had he concluded a peace on the 
terms I have mentioned (and it is plain he would have done it) he ought juflly to 
be confidered in the very contrary light from what he was before* I have already 
anfwered the objection that might be made to my argument from the French 
court's refuting thefe terms, and fhewn that they never thought of making 
peace, but only of penetrating into the fecrets of our cabinet, to difcover what 
hopes they had of procuring better terms than thefe. And we can make little 
doubt but that their end is anfwered, and that they will be able to make a mofl 
excellent peace, for themfelves, now they have found out the principles on which 
we mall negotiate. What advantage can we poflibly expect from a treaty that 
is at once to comprehend the interefts of Germany and Great-Britain ? 

But I mail not trouble the reader with entering further into any reflections on 
a fubject which cannot be confidered without difguft-, 1 mall, only obferve that 
we ought not to be fo extravagant in our praife of a Minifter, who now has fully 
convinced the unprejudiced that he no longer deferves our good opinion ; that 
we have no reafon to .regret his removal from the adminiflration of affairs, if he 
would have had the concluding of a peace. We have for feveral years condemned 
the minifters who formed the treaties of Utrecht and Aix, but we give loud ac- 
clamations of praife to our late patriot for his negotiations ; although there is 
not a fmgle fault to be found in the former treaties, but parallel ones will ap. 
pear in the latter. — i — Pray God of his infinite mercy to grant common fen fe 
to the people of England ! 



t 3° ] 



APPENDIX. 



Numb. r. 

AS I founded part of my argument on the quick renovation of the naval 
ftrength of France after the late war, I (hall here prefent the reader 
1 with a genuine lift of the French navy, as it was in the year 1755, only fix 
years after the peace of Aix, by which it will appear how foon their naval power 
was reftored. 



No 



10 



15 



20 



Ships Names 


Guns 


Where built 


Age 


Royal Louis 


120 


Rochfort 


*75i 


Ocean 


84 




1756 


D. de Bourgogne 


80 


Breft 


1751 


Formidable 


80 




l 75° 


Foudroyant 


80 


Toulon 




Soleil Roy ale 


80 


Breft 


1749 


Tonant 


80 


Toulon 


1743 


Orient 


80 






Algonquin 


74 


Canada 


1753 


Bien Aime 


74 






Centaur 


74 


Toulon 


1756 


Conquerant 


74 


Toulon 


1746 


Courageux 


74 


Breft 


1743 


Couronne « 


74 


Rochfort 


*749 


Defenfeur 


74 


Breft 


1754 


Diademe 


74 


Toulon 


l 75& 


Entrepenant 


74 


Breft 


l 75* 


Experience 


74 




» 


FlorifTant 


74 




*75* 


Glorieux 


74 







[ Si ] 



N< 



25 



SO 



35 



40 



£0 



Ships Names 

Heclor 

Heros 
Intrepide 

Magnifique 
Minotaur 
Palmier 
Protecteur 
Prudent 
Redoubtable 
Robufte 
Sceptre 
Souveraine 
Superbe 
Temmeraire 
Thefee 

La Vainqueur 
La Fortune 
Zodiaque 
Dauphine Royal 
Ferme 
Jufte 
Achilles 
Active 
Alcide 
Altia 
St. Anne 
C. de Provence 
Belliqueux 
Bienfaifant 
Bertine 
Bizarre 
Brilliant 
Capricieux 
Celebre 
Content 
Dragon 
L' Harlaem 
Eyeille 



Guns 


Where built 


74 


Rochfort 


74 


Breft 


74 


Toulon 


74 


Breft 


74 




74 


Breft 


74 




74 


Rochfort 


74 


Toulon 


74 




74 


Breft 


74 


Toulon 


74 


Breft 


74 


Toulon 


74 


Breft 


64 




64 




74 




70 


Breft 


70 


Toulon 


70 


Rochfort 


64 


Toulon 


64 


Breft 


64 




64 


Toulon 


64 


Genoa 


64 




64 


Toulon 


64 


Breft 


64 




6 4 




64 


/ 


64 


Rochfort 


64 


Toulon 


64 


Toulon 


64 


Breft 


64 




64 


Rochfort 



*75| 
175} 
174'! 
*74i 



*735 
1722 

1724 

1747 



J 75* 
1760 

J 753 
*747 



1752 



L 3* J 



>o 



70 



75 



80 



85 



90 



95 



Ships Names 


Guns 


Where built 


Age 


Fontafque 


64 


Toulon 


1756 


Hardi 


64 


Toulon 




Hercules 


64 


Breft 


1748 


Illuftre 


64 


Breft 


175° 


Inflexible 


64 


Rochfort 




Lion 


64 


Toulon 


175* 


Lys 


64 


Breft 


1746 


Modefte 


64 


Toulon 


1751 


Northumberland 


64 


England 


1744 


St. Louis 


60 






Opiniatre 


64 


Breft 


1750 


Orphee 


64 


Toulon 


*749 


Prothee 


64 


Breft 




Raifonablc 


64 


Breft 




Sage 


64 


Toulon 


l 75* 


Solide 


64 


Toulon 




Solitaire 


64 






Sphinx 


64 






Triton 


64 


Toulon 


1747 


Vaillaint 


64 


Toulon 




D. d'Orleans 


60 


. 




Vengeur 


64 






Verge du Eofair 


64 


Genoa 




Verge du S r . 


64 


Genoa 




Leopard 


64 


Toulon 


1720 


St Michelle 


60 


Breft 


*73* 


Warwick 




England 




L'Agile 


54 


Rochfort 


1750 


Alcion 


54 


Toulon 


1724 


Amphion 


56 


Rochfort 


1748 


Arc-en-ciel 


50 






Fier 


54 


Toulon 




Greenwich 


50 


England 




Himptain 


54 


Toulon 


1749 


Orifiamme 


54 


Toulon 


1748 


Sagitaire 








Aquilon 


46 


Toulon 


*733 


Juno 


46 


Havre de Grace 


1748 



i 



t 33 ] 



N* Ships Names 
Belleifle 

Abenakife 
ioo Danae 
Hebe 

Outarde 

Saptier 
105 Aigrette 

Arethufe 

Begon 

Echo 

Favourite 

Felicite 
11© Harmonie 

Hermione 

Le Grand 

Malicieufe 

Baleine 
115 Atalante 

Blonde 

Bouffon 

Brune 

Diane 
120 Pr. Edward 

Hyene 

Ophale 

Veftale 

Zephire 
125 Amethift 

Marechault 

Bellone 

Cornette 

Concord 
130 Fleur de Lys 

Licorne 

Mefiance 

Pylade 

Pomone 
135 Rofe 



Guns 


Where built 


Ag-I 


44 


St. Maloes 


1 75\ 


40 


Canada 


t *j 4 


40 






40 






40 






40 






3* 






36 






36 






36 






3t 


Havre de Grace 


1748 


36 






3* 






36 


Rochfort 


*749 


3* s 






3* 






36 






32 


Toulon 


1741 


32 


Havre de Grace 


32 






32 


Havre de Grace 




32 


Toulon 


1742 


32 






32 


Toulon 


1744 


32 






32 






32 


Toulon 


172a 


32 






30 






30 






30 


Breft 


ns* 


30 






30 


Brett 


l 754 


30 






30 






30 


Toulon 


*749 
I 74.9 


30 


Toulon 


30 


Toulon 



Mi 



*:? 



Nf Ships Names 
Sauvage 
Serieux 
Surprize 
Sylph ide 
140 Syren 
Valeur 

Due. de Choifeul 
Chimere 
Diligente 
Flore 
Tripon 
Mindroe 
Oifeau 

Oifeau de Mer 
150 Atalife 
Avife 

Briftol Privateer 
Cornette 
Emeraude 
Fidelle 
Tierce 
Bien Aime 
Galatea 
Gracieufe 
160 Heroine 
Hirondclle 
Mutine 
Terpfichore 
Thetis 
165 Topaze 
Volage 
Eclair 
Girlande 
M. de Morlaix 
Maitre 
Nymphe 

Petit Cumberland 
Meffager 



»55 



170 



[ 34 3 

Guns 

3^ 
30 
30 
30 

30 

3® 

3° 
26 

26 

26 

26 

26 

26 

26 

24 

24 

24 

24 

24 

24 

24 

22 

24 
24 

24 

24 
24 
24 
24 

24 
24 
22 
22 
22 
22 
22 
20 
20 



Where built 

Breft 

Breft 



Age 









Toulon 
Rochfort 
Rochfort 
Toulon 
Havre de Grace 






1759 






Briftol 


- 


Breft 


1751 


Havre de Grace 


1744 


Rochfort 


*747 


Havre de Grace 


1744 


Breft 


1744 


Toulon 


1749 


Breft 


1744 



Toulon 
Breft 



Breft 
Toulon 



Canada 

Rochfort 

Breft 



1744 



1750 



1746 



C 35 1 



N» 



*75 



180 



185 



190 



*95 



too 



%°S 



Ships Names 


Guns 


Where built 


Mignone 


20 




5 Rhinocerat 


20 




Bellone 


20 




Riche 


16 




Calypfo 


16 




Bienfaifant 


18 




> Renomme 


18 




Chevere 


16 




Efcarbouclc 


16 




Oracle 


16 




Stork 


16 


England 


Turturrelle 


16 




Epreuve 


14 




D. d' Hanover 


14 




Amaranthe 


14 


Breft 


Anemone 


12 


Breft 


Arc-en-ceil 


12 


Breft 


Gigine 


12 




Courftoujours 


12 




Ecureuil 


12 




Hyacinth 


12 




Legree 


12 




Levrier 


12 




Peramine 


12 




Penelope 


12 




Renoncle 


12 




Sardoine 


12 




Pie 


IO 




Mahone 


8 




Agathe 


6 




Bad aire 


6 




Colombe 


6 




Roi de Pruflc 


6 




Monita 


4 


Breft 


Poftillion 


4 





Age 



747 



F 2 



aceb 



[3«] 



Xebeques or Store-Ships. 



Guns 

24 
24 
18 
60 

5° 
40 

40 

22 
12 
10 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 

26 
26 

14 

10 

20 
10 

3* 
24 

24 
20 
24 



Where built 

Toulon 
Toulon 
Toulon 



Age 

1751 

175° 
1751 



Breft 
Rochfort 



Breft 



■ 



N # Ship Namei 
Indifcrete 
210 Requin 
Rufe 

Char\ Roy 1 . 
Marie 
Loire 
215 Serenade 
Profond 
Themis 
Nafaptime 
Charanthe 
220 Sarcelle 
Ballime 
Chameau 
Elephant 
Hermione 
225 Penelope 
Reputfe 
Le Gramont 
Hawke 
Virgin 
230 Le Barclay 
Le Mercure 
Le Lutine 
Le Murine 
Le Senedtere 
Due. de Fronfac 
236 Le Soleil Royal 

Guns 9656 which at athoufand pounds a gun, (an t ; 
eftimate I am informed will give us the coft of afhip fitted out) is 9, 656, ooo£. 
The reader will perceive that much the greater!: part of this navy, was built 
after the year 1748. 

Numb. 



>Englifh Prizes 









Numb. 2. 

Paper on the rights of the two nations to Canada. 

rH E French were conftantly drove out of all parts of North-America by 
the Englifh, who firft difcovered and feized that whole continent. They 
'ere even driven out of Canada itfelf in 1627, 1628, and 1629, and never had 
ly right there (notwithstanding all the pains their commifTaries take, by many falfe 
[Tertions to make out a title) till a right was given them by Charles I. by 
le treaty of St. Germain in 1632 -, who thereby only furrendered to them, tons 
s lieux occupes en la nouvelle France, &c. All the places occupied (or feized) in 
Jew France, Acadia, or Canada, by the fubjects of his majefty of Great-Bri- 
lin. Now it appears from the accounts of Champlain, governor of the coun- 
y, and all others ; that the only places occupied, feized orpojfeffed, in thofe coun- 
:ies, either by the French or Englifh at that time, were Port Royal and St. Sa- 
iours in Nova Scotia, with Tad ouflac and Quebec in Canada. The two firft 
f thefe places they reftored to us by the treaty of Utrecht ; and for the two laft 
iey were to indemnify our fubjects, meaning Sir David Kirk, the only lawful 
roprietor of them, to whom the king had granted them, and from whom he 
ould not take them without a valuable conftderation, amounting to five thoufand 
>ounds, which the French never paid, but flillowe -, as appears from a memorial 
f Sir Lewis Kirk and his brother, to king Charles II. after the reftpration, and 
nany other accounts. 

By this treaty then the king gave up only thofe places, and not the countries.. 
? or that reafon he confirmed his former grants of the country of Canada the 
ery next year after the treaty of St. Germain, as appears from the faid memo- 
ial, the words of which are, " the king of England taking notice that altho' 
he forts and caftles according to the league were delivered up into the poiTefiion 
>f the French (efpecially fuch as had been erected during their poflefTion there - 
»f) yet that his fubjects were not to be excluded from trade or free commerce in 
hole regions, that were firft difcovered and pofifefTed by his fubjects, did, with 
he advice of his council, by his letters patents dated May nth 1633.— -Grant 

into Sir Lewis Kirk full privilege, not only of trade and commerce in the 

iver Canada, (St. Lawrence, fo called) and places on either fide adjacent ; but 
lfo to plant colonies, and build forts and bulwarks, wherever they fhould think 

b." And not only fo, but the king and parliament that fame year 1633, rati- 

ified and confirmed to the fubjects of Britain, five different grants they had 
nade both of Nova Scotia and Canada in the years 1621, 25, 27, 28, and 33,, 
nftead of ceding thofe countries to the French - - ■■For thffe reafons Cromwell- 



fin 



took Nova Scotia from them in 16*54, and maintained our right to it at the 
treaty of Weftminfter in 1655. And alt ho' they had a right to Nova Scotia 
given them afterwards by the treaty of Breda, yet they never had any to Canada 
nor any part of it, but the two places here mentioned. And if due enquiry is 
made, it Will appear that they have no juft right or title to any other part of 
North- America, unlefs we allow ufurpation and encroachment to be a right. For 
thefe reafons Queen Anne maintained in a manifefto in 171 1, her juft 9 and in- 

eontepble rights to all North- America except a part yielded to France which 

was held in fief from the crown of Britain, and ought to revert to it And the city 

of London, in the 2 2d article of their inftru&ions to their reprefentatives hj 
parliament, after the treaty of Utrecht, ordered that enquiry be made, why the 
French were left in poffeffwn of Canada f There is a great change in affairs then 
in fo fliort a time as fince the treaty of Utrecht, if the French now claim twenty 
in twenty-five parts of all North-America, who then had only a right to thefe 
two places ; or at moft, no further than from the mouth of the river St. Law- 
rence to Montreal, with fome fmall claim they may have about Lake Superior 
perhaps.— —l 757. 



Numb. 3. 

ExtratJ from a preliminary convention^ propofed by France to Great-Britain, in 1755* 

« Hp H E fubje&s of his Moft Chriflian Majefty, and of his Britannic Ma- 
X jefty, mall evacuate all the country, fituated between the river Ohio and 
the mountains which form the limits of Virginia ; and mall withdraw, that is to 
fay, the French beyond the faid river, and the Englilh to this fide the faid moun- 
tains •, fo that all the extent of ground which lies between the faid river and the 
faid mountains, fhall be confidered as a neutral country, during the whole time 
that this convention (hall laft ; and all the conceffions, if there mould be any 
fuch made by either fide, on the faid territory, fhall be confidered as null and 
of none effect *. 

* This is a parallel cafe to the article offered by Mr. Pitt concerning the intermediate Indians, 
between our colonies and Louiiiana; and fhews how confonant fuch an article would have been 
with the views of the French. 

Numb. 



I 39 J 



Numb. 4. 

Extras from a memorial delivered by the duke de Mrtpoix to the Britijh Minijlry iy 5§ . 

Of the L 1 m 1 t s of C A N A D A. 

HH H E court of France has, in a decifive manner rejected, and will always 

a rC i eC l the P r °P° fition which has been made by England } that the fouthern 

coafts of the river St. Lawrence, and the Lakes Ontario and Erie, mould ferve 

as limits between the two nations It muft be laid down as a bafis for the ne*» 

nation in regard to this article, that the river St. Lawrence is the center of Ca- 
nada. This truth isjuftified by juft titles, by eminent writers, and by poflefiion 
—-All that France can agree to, after laying down this principle, which cannot 
admit of any reafonable contradiction ; is to examine in regard to this object 
whether the rec.procal convenience of both nations, may not require in this re-' 
ipecl, feme particular arrangement in order to the fixing invariably, the refpec- 
tive limits.-— The only pretext with which the Englilh endeavour to glofs over 
their pretenfions, is taken from article XV. of the treaty of Utrecht; but if all 
the expreffions contained in this article are examined into witkdue attention, it 
will evidently appear, that nothing is lefs founded than the inductions, which 
the court of London would in fact draw from thence, &c. 

Numb. 5. 

The Ninteenth Article of the treaty of Utrecht. 

TT Owever in cafe (which God Almighty forbid) the dilutions which have 

X X been laid afleep, mould at any time be renewed between their faid roval 

majefties or their fucceffors, and break out into open war, the mips, merchan 

jiizes and all the effects, both moveable and immoveable, on both fides which 

Ja be found to remain in the ports and in the dominions of the adverfe party 

Tiall not be confiscated or any wife damaged ; but the entire fpace of fix months 

|o be reckoned from the day of the rupture, mall be allowed to the faid fubjecb 

|)f each of their Royal Majefties, in which they may fell the aforefaid things, or 

liny part elfe of their effects; or carry and remove them from thence whither 

'hey pleale, without any moleftation, and retire from thence themfelves, 



[40] 
Numb. 6. 

Paper on the importance of the Newfoundland fifhery, by Mr. Pofllethwayte. 

" ripHE French have taken every meafure to improve their fifheries in general. 
X fince the treaty of Utrecht. They have exceedingly increafed that to 
Newfoundland as well on the coaft as on the Great Bank. Nor do they fifh only | 
on the Great Bank, for fuch fifh as are cured without drying, as the Dutch do! 
in their white herring filhery in the open fea ; but have had the addrefs to obtain, | 
that the ifland of Cape Breton fhould be yielded to them to fortify, and do what 
they pleafe with-, where they have been long ftruggling to eftablifh another;! 
Dunkirk, to the ruin of the Britifh American commerce ; and where they carry 
on their dry fifhery as well as at Placentia. But as if this was not privilege enough 
for them, we have impoliticly granted them the liberty to refort to the very ifland of 
Newfoundland itfelf, and er eel ft ages, &c. to cure and dry their fifh, to the unfpeakable 
detriment of our fifhery there. I 

In the time of king Charles I. the French paid us a tribute for the liberty of I 
curing and drying fifh at Newfoundland, and we could deprive them of it when- 
ever we pleafed. Of late years they have not only ceafed to pay tribute, but, by 
their neighbourhood at Cape Breton, will oblige us to keep large garrifons as 
well at Nova Scotia as Newfoundland, if we will prevent our being furprized , 
where at Newfoundland they have the liberty of the fifhing feafon equally with ' 
us from Cape Bonavifta northward to the northern point of the faid ifland, and 
by which they are alfo become our rivals, in a very fine falmon fifhery there. The 
French are now become fo much our competitors in this trade, and are encreafed 
to fuch a degree, that they employ yearly above five hundred fail of fhipping to 
carry on their fifhing on the Great Bank of Newfoundland, and on the coaft of 
that ifland ; that is in their wet and dry fifh : hereby they have not only fupplicfl 
themfelves with the fifh they formerly took from us, but furnifh many parts of 
Spain and Italy therewith to our prodigious lofs." 

Surely this paper proves the bad confequences of the article on this fubjec"t in 
the Britifh Memorial ! 



Numb. 



Numb. 7. 

An ejlimate of the value of the Imports, &c. of our fugar colonics. 

From the African traders in negroes. : — _ - 2 , Q 00 ^ 

From Ireland in beef, pork, herrings, butter, &V. . ■■ I00 000 
From our northern colonies, in horfes, lumber, fifh, bifcuit, } 

flower, corn, &c. J 250,000 

From the Madeira traders in wine _ g 0oo 

From Great-Britain, directly in goods and merchandize 400, 000 

And they pay in Britain on their own produce, for duty, about 200, 000 

For freight 275^000 

For commiffion, brokerage, &c. to factors ■ 195,000 

Pi, 740,000 
And the ballance of their produce (which produce has been-> 
about 1,950,000/. as near as we can calculate) All cen- / 
ters in England, being for intereft of money, for expences > 210, 000 
of abfentees refiding here, education of children, gover- 1 
nors, and other officers -* 



Or 114, 000, 000 /. fince the refloration. 



1,950,000 



The value of the yearly tranfactions in this circle of trade, may be computed as 
follows : 

By the annual produce . 1, 950, 000 

By their annual expences and charges — . 1 5 740, 00O 

By ballance centering in England as above mentioned — 210,000 

By fugar and other productions re-exported — 600, 000 

By returns made for the faid re-exported goods 720, 000 

5, 220,000 

The laft two articles Great-Britain has loft to the French. Sure thefc efti- 
rnates mew how much our miniftry were to blame for offering to reftore the ifland 
of Guardaloupe, when their fugar-trade fo much exceeded ours, and when we 

G fee 



H -* ] 

fee the immenfe value of this important branch ! At the time when thi 
calculation was made, the French re-exported to the amount of 1,000, ooq 
The difference of encouragement between the two nations, will be feen frot 
the following 

Calculation of the yearly produce and expence of a great Barbadoes planter, 
Suppofe the planter pofTefTed of 

£. 

1000 Acres of land (with z wind-mills, and 2 or 4 fugar \ 

\ \ *. 1 ° ° ° i 20,000 

works) at 20/. per acre > 9 

500 Negroes at 30/. per head — — — * 15, 000 

200 Head of cattle, for work and dung at 10/. — 2,000 

40 Horfes for work and dung 20/. ■■ — ■- 800 

20 AiTes for Ditto at 40 s. * 1 — 40 

100 Sheep at 20s. — ■ • — — • 100 

100 Hogs for Ditto at 12 s. — *— — 60 



The buildings together with coppers, ftills, worm-tubs, "J 
coolers, leaden citterns, wind-mill-cafes, brarTes, pots, / 
drips, waggons, carts, and many other plantation uten- f 
fils may coft J 



38,000 
12,000 



The yearly produce, 50, 000 

Pots of fugar (at 60 IB. each) 7000 at 9^. ■ 3, 150 

Rum and melafTes ■ ^ - 1, 050 



4>200 



N. B. If the fugar be improved by claying, it is computed fuch an eflate will 
clear to the planter 350/. over-and-above the 1660L as under. So that the 
mod the planter gaini from his eflate is 2/. 14s. per Cent. For 1000/. on 
5o> 000/, is but 2 /. per Cent, and 5350 /. no more than 2 /. 14s, per Cent, per 
Ann, 



The 



E43f 

The yearly expence. 

Salaries for managers, overfeers, drivers, workmen, bookkeeper, > 
town agents, doctors, farriers, &c. V 

60 Barrels of beef and pork » — „ 

60 Hogfheads of refufe fifh or herrings * - > 

Flour, bread, and bacon ■ » ■■ * - ■■ ■ "— — • 

-Cloaths for 500 negroes at 6s per head — - 

Oats, beans, and corn ■ ■■ — 

Lumber ■■ ■ -— — — 

Carpenters, fmiths, mafons, plumbers, brafiers, wheelwrights 
Charges for the militia _— , > , ,,, - 

Supply of utenfils ■ ■ ■ ■— ■ * ■ 

Supply of negroes — 

Ditto of cattle — ■—* — — 

Ditto of horfes — -— — — 

Ditto of afles — - — • — — — ** 



Ballance to the planter 



500 

100 
300 

5° 
150 
300 
20a 
150 
150 
120 
180 
700 
120 
160 

20 



3,200 
1,000 

4> 2 oo 



Calculation of the yearly produce and expence of a great French fugar plant< 

on rich and frefh lands. 



Suppofe him pofTelTed of, 

1000 Acres of land, the charges of taking it up, &c. we will? 

fay may come to 3 

200 Negroes at 30/. ■ ■ — 

100 Head of cattle (for work and bread) at 30 s. — • 

Horfes and mules — — • «— — • 

Sheep, hogs, &c. will more than anfwer the charges of keeping ) 

v, by their encreafe J 

Building implements, and utenfils of all forts — *— 



150 
6, 000 ' 

2 Of 
2,0c 



8,5' 



144 J 

The yearly produce. 

L 

Pounds of Mofcovado fegar, 420,000 at 8 s. per hundred i, 680 

Gallons of rum and melaifes 21,000 (which is 5 for every J 

hundred weight of iugar) rum at 8#. melafTes at 4*/. per > 525 

gallon i the medium at 6d. per gallon, comes to 5 



2,205 



N. B. It appears from this calculation; that the French planter gains a ballance of 
I, 55; /. pen Annum, by laying out 8, 500/. which is intereft for his money at 
the rate of 18/-. 5*. \od. per Cent, per Annum. Formerly when the Englifh 
planter had the like advantages, he gained 20 per Cent, and then could well 
afford to allow 15 per Cent, -intereft. 

The yearly expense. - 

- I- 

Salaries to managers — — — — . 150 

Salt prcrvifions, beef, pork, fifh, &e. 166 

Cloaths for 200 negroes, at 10 s. per head •— — — * ig;j 

Timber and materials for repairs ■ — 70 

Workmanmip ~ — - — — 40* 

Supply of utenfils « < ■■ »■■ ■■ — ^o 

Negroes (nothing) 

Cattle (nothing) 

" Horfes and mules ■ — ■■■ ■ ; • ' 40 

Expences that may be omitted — > » . 40 

650 

Ballance to planter -*- — — — 1,555 

*> [ 2,205 

N. B. That France has tranfported her people to her iugar colonies, and given them 
a year's provifiens and land for nothing ; that on Hifpaniola cattle are bought 
for four, five, or fix pieces of eight ; that timber and frefh proviftons being 
raifed on their own lands lefTens the expence ; that negroes not being ov^r. 
worked, they encreaie, rather than decreafe, and fo do the cattle, &c t Heavy 
articles thefe againji our fugar ifiands !